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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j), which provides for this Court to hear appeals from "orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Plaintiffs

Motion for an Enlargement of Time?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a Motion for Enlargement of Time for an abuse of discretion. See
Crosslandv. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah
1984).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to alter or amend

its findings pursuant to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion?
Standard of Review: A review for an abuse of discretion is proper
for a trial court's decision to deny a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. See College
Irrigation Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1245
(Utah 1989).
3.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint?

Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to
dismiss a Plaintiffs complaint for correctness. See Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 996 P.2d
540, 542 n.2 (Utah 2000).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES, AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced in the
addendum to Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action for alleged personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle
accident which occurred on September 23, 1995, on 1-15 in Beaver County, Utah.
Plaintiffs action was commenced on or about June 5, 1998.
Defendant Seth Albert Smith, who was in his eighties at the time the action
was commenced, passed away at his home in Beaver, Utah, on December 23, 1998. A
suggestion of his death was filed pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure on December 24, 1998, and when Plaintiff herein failed to file for a
substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 within the specified ninety days, a motion to
dismiss was filed, which was granted by the trial court. The trial court subsequently
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denied Plaintiffs Motion for an Extension of Time filed after the Motion to Dismiss.
That order, entered on or about August 4, 1999, is the subject of the Plaintiffs appeal.
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below
This action was commenced by Plaintiff nearly three years after the motor
vehicle accident, which is the subject Plaintiffs Complaint. (See Plaintiffs Complaint R.
2-3.) At the time of the motor vehicle accident in question, Defendant Seth Albert Smith
was approximately eighty-five years old and, in his answer, Defendant Seth Albert Smith
set forth as one of his affirmative defenses the doctrine of laches on the basis of his
advanced age and poor health. (See Defendant's Answer, Third Defense, R. 7-10.)
Approximately six months after commencement of the action and less than
three months after Defendant's Answer was filed, Defendant Seth Albert Smith passed
away at his home in Beaver, Utah, on December 23, 1998.
Seth Albert Smith had been represented throughout the case by S. Baird
Morgan of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. Upon his passing in December 1998,
decedent's daughter and sons, in contacting and advising their late father's counsel of his
passing, understood and agreed that existing counsel would notify the court and parties of
his death and continue to represent their father's estate and Phyllis Meyers as personal

3

representative of the estate in the pending action. See Addendum "A," Affidavit of Phyllis
Meyers. (R. 85-87.)
With the knowledge of Phyllis Meyers, a Suggestion of Death, dated
December 24, 1998, was filed with the court and served on Plaintiffs counsel. There is
no dispute in this case that the Suggestion of Death was received by Plaintiffs counsel.
The ninety days required under Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for appointment of a substitute expired on March 24, 1999. Plaintiff failed to
meet the ninety-day requirement. On March 30, 1999, Defendant moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Rule 25. In response, on April 5, 1999, Plaintiff filed a
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and, for the first time,
moved for an enlargement of time to file a motion to appoint a substitute for the deceased
Defendant.1
Defendant's motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs motion to enlarge were ruled
upon by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision of June 1, 1999, and an Order
granting Defendant's motion to dismiss was entered on or about August 4, 1999. See
Addendum "B," Memorandum Decision of June 1, 1999. (R 39-51.)

1

Unlike Stoddard, Plaintiff Donahue did not move at that time to substitute another
defendant for Smith.
4

Following receipt of the trial court's Memorandum Decision denying the
motion for enlargement and granting Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff joined in
Plaintiff Stoddard's motion to alter or amend, pursuant to Rule 59(e) U.R.C.P. This
motion to alter or amend was eventually the subject of the trial court's ruling dated
October 12, 1999, and an Order dismissing Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice, pursuant
to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which Order is dated November 10,
1999, and which is the subject of this appeal. See Addendum "B," Order of Dismissal.
(R 144-176.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is an action for personal injury allegedly arising from a motor

vehicle accident of September 23, 1995. Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on or about June
5, 1998. (R. 2-3.)
2.

Defendant, Seth Albeit Smith, died on December 23, 1998. (R. 14.)

3.

At the time of Mr. Smith's passing, Ms. Myers, who was later

appointed to act as personal representative of her father's estate, understood and
consented to her father's attorney notifying the Court and parties of his death. She also
understood and agreed that defense counsel would continue to represent the interest of
Mr. Smith's estate and Ms. Meyers as personal representative. (R. 83-84.)
5

4.

Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a

Suggestion of Death was filed with the Court on December 24, 1998, after being
informed of Defendant's death by Defendant's daughter, Phyllis Meyers. See Addendum
"C," Suggestion of Death. (R. 13-14.)
5.

Plaintiffs counsel was served with the Suggestion of Death on

December 28, 1998. (R. 49-50.)
6.

The ninety days in which to substitute parties under Rule 25 expired

on March 24, 1999.
7.

Counsel for decedent and the estate filed a Motion to Dismiss on

March 30, 1999 (R. 15-17).
8.

On April 5, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enlarge Time for

appointing a substitute party (R. 26-27). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Appoint a
Substitute for Decedent and opposed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the same day.
(Id)
9.

On June 1, 1999, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision

granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 39-51.) That decision was later reduced to
an Order on or about August 4, 1999. (R. 114-116.)
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10.

On June 4, 1999, before the trial court's decision was reduced to an

Order, Plaintiff joined in Plaintiff Stoddard's Motion to Alter or Amendment the Court's
Findings. (R. 53-65.)
11.

On October 12, 1999, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision

addressing Plaintiffs June 4, 1999, Motion. (R. 129-143.)
12.

Based on the trial court's October 12 ruling, an Order dismissing

Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice was entered on November 10, 1999. (R. 144-176.)
13.

On November 24, 1999, a Notice of Appeal from the November 10

Order was filed. (R. 180-81.)
14.

Plaintiffs appeal isfromthe trial court's final Order of

November 10, 1999.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Brian Keith Donahue ("Plaintiff) appeals from a trial court
decision dismissing with prejudice his lawsuit against Appellee Seth Albert Smith
("Defendant"). The dismissal came after Plaintiff failed to file a substitution of parties
within ninety days after Defendant's counsel notified the trial court of Defendant's death.
The trial court was correct to grant the Motion to Dismiss. Under Rule 25
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party or representative of a deceased party must

7

move to substitute another party for a deceased party within ninety days after a
Suggestion of Death is filed with the court. If a party fails to do so, the action must be
dismissed.
The Suggestion of Death filed in this case was valid and triggered the
ninety-day limitation because the Rule's plain language did not prohibit decedent's
counsel from filing the Suggestion of Death, did not require that notice of the Suggestion
of Death be served on the decedent's representatives or successors, and did not require
the Suggestion of Death to identify a person who could be substituted.
First, Defendant's counsel was not prohibited under Rule 25 from filing the
Suggestion of Death. Nothing in the language of the Rule states such a prohibition.
Indeed, even if this Court were to read into the language of Rule 25 the requirement
argued by Plaintiff that it be filed on behalf of the decedent's estate, that requirement was
met in this case as evidenced by the affidavit of the decedent's daughter and personal
representative, Phyllis Meyers.
No Utah law, and certainly nothing in Rule 25, expressly provides that the
Suggestion of Death also must be filed by a person officially appointed as the
representative of the estate, as Plaintiff suggests. Such a requirement would impose an
inflexibility on the Rule that was not intended. Moreover, Plaintiffs interpretation would
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require in every instance a deceased defendant's estate to initiate costly probate
proceedings that would benefit only the plaintiff. These results surely cannot arise from
the absence of any language in the Rule specifying who must file the Suggestion of
Death.
Plaintiffs arguments also contravene sound public policy. The decedent's
attorney is in the best position to notify the court of a litigant's death. The attorney also
has a professional duty to make certain his client's case is resolved. The attorney is also
obligated, as an officer of the court, to bring to the court's attention a significant
development in the case andfromkeeping the court hanging in "judicial impotence."
Third, even if Rule 25 can be construed to mean that only a party or
personal representative of the decedent's estate may file a Suggestion of Death, the filing
was still valid because the decedent's attorney received authority from the decedent's
estate to continue representation. Shortly after Defendant's death, Phyllis Meyers,
decedent's daughter, approached the attorney in this case and asked him to continue
handling the case and to represent the estate. The attorney, therefore, had independent
standing to file the Suggestion of Death.
Last, Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by denying Plaintiffs Motion for
an Extension of Time to Substitute Parties. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

9

denying Plaintiffs motion because Plaintiff failed to produce any facts showing
"excusable neglect." Plaintiffs only reason for filing the substitution motion after the
ninety-day limitation period under Rule 25 was that his counsel was busy moving his
office. The trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that excuse, alone, did
not satisfy the standard for excusable neglect, even in light of absence of any prejudice to
Defendant.
ARGUMENT2
POINT I
COUNSEL WAS ENTITLED TO RELY ON THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF RULE 25.
Plaintiffs three-fold argument that the ninety-day limitation period under
Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was not triggered has no basis in the plain
language of Rule 25. Nowhere does the Rule prohibit the attorney of the deceased from
filing the Suggestion of Death, or mandate that the Suggestion of Death must identify

2

The arguments in this case are substantially similar to thosefiledin the companion case
Stoddard v. Smith, No. 991015, which is currently under consideration for consolidation.
Nevertheless, some differences in argument do appear throughout Plaintiffs briefs in Stoddard
and in this case; therefore, Defendant urges this Court to carefully consider both cases, as
submitted, in their entirety.
10

who may be substituted as a party, or that the Suggestion of Death must be served on the
decedent's representative.
Plaintiffs arguments are a mix of federal and state decisions3 that interpret
rules in other jurisdictions that are distinct from Utah's Rule 25. Significantly, Plaintiff
has not pointed to any language in Utah's Rule 25 that supports his arguments. The
simple truth is that no language in Rule 25 supports any of Plaintiff s arguments.
Defendant, his remaining family, and their counsel were entitled to rely
upon the plain language of the Rule. Under rules of construction, this Court should
interpret Rule 25 according to its plain language unless some ambiguity in the Rule must
be resolved. See Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm >7, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah
1991); Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah
1983). Plaintiff, however, has not argued that the Rule is ambiguous, and for good reason.
The Rule is not ambiguous at all. In fact, it is clear that a motion to substitute parties must
be filed ninety days after the Suggestion of Death is filed on the record. The Rule reads:
3

This Court is most likely well aware that other states' interpretations of their own
substitution of parties rules are not controlling precedent for this jurisdiction. Utah's Rule 25,
however, is substantially similar to Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah has
chosen to omit the federal Rule's language allowing for service "in any judicial district" and has
also chosen to omit the accompanying Federal Form 30. Otherwise, the two rules are identical.
Therefore, federal court decisions, as long as they do not contradict Utah state law, are persuasive
authority in interpreting the pertinent provisions of this Rule. See Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc. 122
Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205 (1953) (construing Rule 41).
11

If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion
for substitution may be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased party and,
together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the
parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons.
Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than
ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by
service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.
Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff failed to move for a substitution of parties and now wishes to mitigate that error
by faulting the manner in which the Suggestion of Death was filed.
This Court should not indulge Plaintiffs attempt to shift blame. Rule 25
directs that a Suggestion of Death shall be filed with the court—nothing more, nothing
less.4 Counsel relied on the Rule's plain language and complied with its direction.
Accordingly, the Suggestion of Death, as prepared and filed in this case, triggered the
ninety-day limitation period. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's decision
to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint.

4

Plaintiffs argument that additional service of process of the Suggestion of Death is
discussed in Point IV, infra.
12

POINT II
THE NINETY-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD UNDER RULE 25 WAS
TRIGGERED BY A VALID SUGGESTION OF DEATH.
The trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiff filed an untimely Motion
for an enlargement of time ninety-nine days after the Suggestion of Death was filed. This
conclusion necessarily followed from the trial court's determination that the Suggestion
of Death had been properly filed. Rule 25 did not prohibit the decedent's counsel from
filing the Suggestion of Death for three reasons: (1) the plain language of Rule 25 does
not specify who may or may not file a Suggestion of Death, (2) Rule 25 does not require
the person who files a Suggestion of Death to be named as the estate's official
"representative," and (3) counsel was acting on behalf of decedent's estate when he filed
the Suggestion of Death and had proper standing to do so.
A.

The plain language of Rule 25 does not specify who may or may
not file a Suggestion of Death.

Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than
ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by
service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.
Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (Emphasis added.)

13

According to the plain language of the Rule, a party or a representative of
the deceased must file a motion for substitution of parties. Nevertheless, nowhere does
the Rule specify who must file a Suggestion ofDeath. The Rule states in the passive
voice only that once the Suggestion of Death is made "upon the record" by "service of a
statement of the fact of the death," then the ninety days begins to run for accomplishment
of a motion for substitution. There is no prohibition against such a statement of the fact of
the death being made by anyone. Nothing in this language prohibits the deceased's
attorney from filing the Suggestion of Death.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff still contends that, by reading between the lines of
the Rule, one can imply such a prohibition. Plaintiffs argument, and the decision on
which it relies, see Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1969), invokes the Advisory
Committee notes to the federal Rule, which state that u[i]f a party or the representative of
the deceased party desires to limit the time within which another may make the motion
[to substitute a party], he may do so by suggesting the death upon the record." Again,
nothing in this language requires only a party or representative of the deceased to file the
Suggestion of Death. The Advisory Notes suggest only that if a party or representative
wishes to limit the time in which an opposing party can file a motion for substitution of
parties, he or she may do so by filing a Suggestion of Death on the record. In no way,

14

however, does this language, the language in Utah's rule, or the language in the federal
rule prohibit the decedent's attorneyfromfilinga Suggestion of Death and thereby trigger
the running of the ninety days.
B.

Rule 25 does not require a person who files a Suggestion of Death
to be formally appointed as the estate's "representative."

Plaintiff also argues the Suggestion of Death was not valid because counsel
was not a party or the official representative of the decedent's estate. Br. of Plaintiff, pp.
14-19. The court in Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467 (2nd Cir. 1998)
encountered an identical argument. In that case, the widow of the deceased defendant
filed a Suggestion of Death with the court pursuant to federal Rule 25. See id. at 469.
After the plaintiff failed to name a substitute party within ninety days, the widow moved
to dismiss the action. See id Citing Al-Jundi v. Estate ofRockefeller, 757 F. Supp. 206,
210 (W.D.N. Y. 1990), the plaintiff argued that the widow could not file a valid
Suggestion of Death because she "was not a party and not a formal or appointed
representative." Unicorn Tales, 138 F.3d at 469.
The Second Circuit in Unicorn Tales rejected that argument, concluding
that "the text of Rule 25(a)(1) contains no such restriction on who may file the
statement." To accept the plaintiffs argument, the court reasoned, would gut the federal
Rule's 1963 amendment, which was designed to give the Rule greater flexibility. See id.
15

at 469-70. "Under [the plaintiffs] proposed interpretation of Rule 25(a)(1), the estate
must be probated and a representative selected before the statement of the fact of death
can be filed. There is simply nothing in the rule or the advisory committee notes to
suggest that Congress intended Rule 25(a)(1) to be so inflexible." Id. at 470.
To impose such formal restrictions on the filing of a Suggestion of Death
would essentially require a deceased defendant's heirs or successors, nonparties to the
plaintiffs lawsuit, to initiate costly and potentially lengthy probate proceedings when
they may otherwise choose not to. "There is no reason why the [decedent's heirs or
successors] should incur the expense of a probate proceeding which would benefit only
[the plaintiff]... . The law cannot assure a penurious plaintiff of an all-expense paid trip
through the judicial process." Les Carbeau v. Rodrigues, 286 A.2d 246, 248 (R.I. 1972).
Moreover, prohibiting the decedent's attorney from alerting the court and
counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. Who better to file the
Suggestion of Death than the attorney involved in the decedent's case? Indeed, as an
officer of the court, the attorney has a duty to notify the court and other parties in the
action that his client has died. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Group v. District Court of the
Second Judicial District ofDenver, 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo. 1973) ("In our view, an
attorney for a deceased defendant has a duty to notify the court and other parties in the
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action that his client has died/' (Emphasis added.)); Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.2d 748, 750
(Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (holding Georgia's Rule 25 remained "silent as to the identity of the
appropriate person to suggest death on the record" and did not preclude deceased attorney
fromfilingSuggestion of Death); Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521 (Ala. 1983)
(overruled on other grounds); LesCarbeau, 286 A.2d at 247 (holding even if client's
death terminates attorney/client relationship, "it is a technicality which overlooks the fact
that courts can pass upon questions raised and listen to suggestions as to their disposal
from an attorney who is an officer of the court"). Certainly, the decedent's
representatives have no interest in making sure Plaintiffs claims against the decedent's
estate remain in place. Cf. Holmes v. Arbeitman, 857 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (reasoning decedent's representatives had no incentive to file Suggestion of Death
for appeal because decedent prevailed at trial).
Essentially, Plaintiff would have an attorney, suddenly faced with the death
of a client, throw his or her hands in the air, ignore the pending litigation, and declare his
or her interest in the matter absolved. Such reasoning flies in the face of an attorney's
duty to the court and responsibilities as a legal professional in Utah. Utah's Rules of
Professional Conduct require that
Unless the [attorney-client] relationship is terminated as
provided in Rule 1.16 [addressing whether an attorney must
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terminate representation because of crime or fraud], a lawyer
should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for
a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific
matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been
resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial
period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may
assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing
basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal.
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 cmt. [3]. Cf. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d
1195, 1200 (Utah 1985) ("Even in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship,
circumstances may give rise to an implied professional relationship or afiduciaryduty
toward the client, thereby invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of law.")
Other policies support Defendant's position. The Missouri Court of
Appeals, after considering the practical effect its ruling would have on the judicial
process, concluded that the decedent's attorney had proper standing to file a Suggestion
of Death. See Holmes, 857 S.W.2d at 444. Although Missouri's rule specifies that "any
party or any person in interest" may file a Suggestion of Death, the underlying policy
rationale remains the same. A Suggestion of Death allows the court to "proceed with its
business and not be held in a state of judicial impotence." Id. As a practical matter, the
Missouri court concluded that "[t]he most logical person to advise the court of the death
of the party is the attorney representing him. We are unable to conclude that the Rule is
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intended to preclude the Suggestion of Death being made by the most logical person to
make it."5 Id
In the present case, the trial court was not wrong to follow the same
reasoning. After Defendant's death in this case, the decedent's daughter approached her
father's attorney in this action and expressed her desire for him to continue handling the
matter. Existing counsel had handled the case from the beginning, was familiar with the
facts of the case, was familiar with its issues, and had appeared before the court and knew
opposing counsel. As such, existing case counsel was the most appropriate person to file
the Suggestion of Death. Moreover, at the time the Suggestion of Death was filed,
existing counsel was acting as counsel for Defendant's estate and for its personal
representative. See Affidavit of Phyllis Meyers, \ 7 (R. 85-87). The Suggestion of Death
was properly filed and gave Plaintiff adequate notice of the opposing party's death. The
trial court was correct to so rule.

5

In the companion case to this matter, Plaintiff Stoddard argues in his Reply Brief that "an
attorney's duty to notify the court of his or her client's death does not give that attorney the
authority to make motions on behalf of a deceased person." That argument misunderstands the
nature of a Suggestion of Death, which is not a "motion," but a statement of fact supplied to the
court. Nowhere in the Suggestion of Death filed in this case did the decedent's counsel "move"
the court for any action. Rather, the Suggestion of Death merely informed the court that the
Defendant in the case had passed away. This reasoning is completely consistent with Rule 25's
language, which does not specify who may or may not file a Suggestion of Death.
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C.

Counsel had authority to act on behalf of the decedent's estate.

Even if Rule 25 can be construed to mean that only a party or personal
representative of the decedent's estate may file a Suggestion of Death, the filing was still
valid because the decedent's counsel received authority from the decedent's estate to
continue representation.
As discussed above, the estate's personal representative, Phyllis Meyers,
contacted her father's attorney shortly after the decedent's death and retained him to
represent the decedent's estate. See Affidavit of Phyllis Meyers (R. 85-87). Ms. Meyers
and her brothers had actual knowledge of the death and the pending litigation. It was their
wish that their father's counsel, who had handled the case from the beginning and who
was familiar its details, continue to represent the interest of Mr. Smith's estate and Ms.
Meyers as personal representative. Prior counsel, therefore, had standing—independent
of any relationship with the deceased—to inform the court of the defendant's death on
behalf of the estate and its representative.
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POINT ffl
RULE 25 DOES NOT REQUIRE A SUGGESTION OF DEATH TO IDENTIFY
WHO MAY BE SUBSTITUTED AS A PARTY.
Plaintiff next asserts that Rule 25(a)(1) requires a Suggestion of Death to
identify a representative of the estate or the successor of the decedent. Nothing in the
Rule, however, imposes on the party filing a Suggestion of Death such a responsibility,
and Plaintiff has failed to cite any relevant Utah law to support his argument. Instead,
Plaintiff points to several federal court decisions that, in interpreting the corollary to the
federal rule, impose an implicit duty to identify a substitute party.
As noted in Defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Form 30—a model Suggestion of Death form—includes a provision for
the party filing a Suggestion of Death to include the name of the substitute party. Utah,
however, has not followed the federal rule's approach and has, in fact, declined to adopt
federal Form 30 or any provision requiring a Suggestion of Death to name a substitute
party. Plaintiff suggests that Utah's decision not to adopt Form 30 has no bearing on Rule
25fs "implicit" requirement to identify a successor party. Plaintiffs argument relies upon
the spurious proposition that Rule 25 imposes a duty to personally serve the decedent's
representatives. See Br. of Plaintiff, p. 32 (citing Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.
Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Kan. 1991)). As discussed below, Rule 25 does not require the
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decedent's representatives to personally serve themselves with notice that they have filed
a Suggestion of Death, and nothing in Utah's Rule 25 expressly requires a Suggestion of
Death to name a successor party to the deceased.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argument, and the Fehrenbacher dicta on which it
relies, contravenes the adversarial nature of the civil justice system. It is the plaintiff's
responsibility, not the defendant's, to pursue a cause of action. To interpret the Rule as
Plaintiff suggests would skew the burdens placed on civil litigants and require a potential
defendant to facilitate the very claims which may be asserted against him. Other state
courts have rejected this result, recognizing, as this Court should, that nothing in Rule 25
requires a Suggestion of Death to name a successor party. For example, in Farmers
Insurance Group v. District Court of the Second Judicial District ofDenver, 507 P.2d
865, 867 (Colo. 1973), the plaintiff argued that Colorado's rule, which was then similar
to Utah's, implicitly required a Suggestion of Death to identify a proper substitute party.
The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that:
nothing in our rules . . . could reasonably be a basis for
requiring that notification of death of a defendant should
include the identity of the deceased defendant's executor,
administrator, or representative. It seems quite basic and
reasonable that a plaintiffs attorney who receives notification
of a defendant's death has the responsibility to promptly
initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the identity of a
person to be substituted for the deceased defendant, and to
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file a motion for substitution in accordance with our Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Id at 867-68.
Likewise, inMullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.2d 748, 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977), the
court rejected the same argument:
Although our legal tradition places a premium on fairness,
litigation still involves an adversary system. The burden of
ascertaining the proper party to be substituted for a deceased
litigant is properly placed on the party who would effect the
substitution. We hold, therefore, that".. . the statement of the
fact of the death . . ." which includes the name of the
deceased and the date of the death is a sufficient suggestion of
death.
Id at 750. See also Holmes v. Arbeitman, 857 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("In
an adversary system the burden of continuing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
should rest upon the party whose interest is served by the continuation of the appeal
process. We are not persuaded by the apparent belief of the Rende v. Kay court that the
burden should be differently placed.")
Moreover, the reasoning advanced in Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), should not sway this Court to read into Rule 25 a requirement that is not
stated. In Rende, the Circuit Cotirt for the District of Columbia opined that Rule 25 could
"be used as a weapon by civil defense attorneys to 'place on plaintiff the burden, where
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no conventional representative was appointed for the estate in probate court, of instituting
machinery in order to produce some representative of the estate ad litem, pending
appointment of the representative contemplated by law of the domicile of the deceased.5"
Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467, 470 (2nd Cir. 1998) (quoting Rende, 415
F.2d at 986). Although this dilemma might have been a valid reason for reading a
requirement into Rule 25 to name a successor party, it amounts to nothing more than legal
hand-wringing. Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure, like their federal counterparts, already
provide means by which a plaintiff may obtain relief. As the trial court made clear, Rule
6(b)6 allows a plaintiff to request additional time in which to file a motion for substitution
should the Plaintiff encounter any difficulty in identifying a substitute party. See
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 (R. 144-176); see also Unicom Tales, 138 F.3d at 470.

6

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) states:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the
period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a)
and (g), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in
them.
24

Thus, Rule 6(b) prevents a defendant from thwarting the plaintiffs diligent efforts to
pursue his claim. There is no need for this Court "to engraft an exception to" Rule 25
when a valid means of achieving the plaintiffs purpose already exists. King v. Tyree's of
Tampa, Inc., 315 So.2d 538, 540 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting reasoning in Rende).
In this case, Plaintiff made no motion to enlarge the time to substitute a
party within the ninety days of Rule 25. Instead, Plaintiff waited ninety-nine days after
receiving the Suggestion of Death before requesting additional time. The trial court
concluded this delay in filing the motion for substitution of parties was not made in good
faith and found that there was no showing of reasonable excuse. Plaintiff had notice of
Defendant's death but "simply put this case on the back burner because there were more
pressing matters pending and chose to let the ninety day period lapse." Memorandum
Decision, p. 5 (R. 144-176). The trial court's decision was not error, nor was it an abuse
of discretion under Rule 6(b). Defendant's counsel complied with Rule 25fs language,
and it was Plaintiffs obligation to proceed with his cause of action. Defendant should not
be penalized for following the plain language of Rule 25 and for Plaintiffs subsequent
failure to do so.
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POINT IV
RULE 25, WHEN READ AS A WHOLE, DOES NOT REQUIRE THE
SUGGESTION OF DEATH TO BE SERVED UPON THE DECEDENT'S
REPRESENTATIVES.
Plaintiff directs this Court's attention to federal and state court decisions
which have required that the decedent's representatives be served with a Suggestion of
Death, see, e.g., Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Kan. 1991);
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990); Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231,
322-34 (9th Cir. 1994);7 however, these rulings hardly represent a majority position.
Indeed, other state and federal courts have ruled to the contrary and have rejected a
requirement that the decedent's representative be served with a Suggestion of Death in
order to trigger the 90-day limitation. See Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005
(S.D.N.Y. 1973);In re Cardoza, 111 B.R. 906 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); cf. Unicorn
Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467 (2nd Cir. 1998); Farmers Ins. Group v. District
Court of the Second Judicial Dist. ofDenver, 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973) (holding

7

The majority of cases Plaintiff cites to support his argument involve the death of the
plaintiff, which raises concerns not present in this case. See, e.g., Kissic v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 641 So.2d 250, 252-53 (Ala. 1994); Ripple v. Wold, 572 N.W.2d 439 (S.D. 1997);
Hilsabeckv. Lane Co., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 313 (D. Kan. 1996); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d
835 (10th Cir. 1990); Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231 (9th Cir. 1994); Fariss v. Lynchburg
Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Suggestion of Death need not include name of successor party); Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.
2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (same).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that service, if not expressly required by the
Rule, was necessary in this instance because the decedent's representatives or heirs may
be prejudiced because they "may need to act to preserve a counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party complaint for the estate." Br. of Plaintiff, p. 28. This argument, however,
assumes that Plaintiffs action remains in full force. As explained above, the primary
concern when a party dies during litigation is that the parties with causes of action be
notified of the death in order to preserve any claims against the estate. However, when
the plaintiff dies, the plaintiffs successor has the burden of deciding whether the preserve
plaintiffs claim by substituting a new plaintiff. It is therefore reasonable to require a
Suggestion of Death to be served on the plaintiffs successor when the plaintiff dies.
No such purpose exists for the defendant's representatives or heirs, who
have no need to preserve a cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim when the
plaintiffs case is dismissed.8 As one court has recognized, "Rule 25(a)(1) speaks of
8

The argument that a decedent's successors or representatives may wish to avoid the
dismissal of a lawsuit to preserve a compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim is without merit.
Indeed, Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires di party to assert a counterclaim at
the time the party serves a pleading if the claim "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." Defendant's successors
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dismissal. The only individual who is injured by a dismissal is a plaintiff. It is of no
moment to the deceased defendant or his heirs or successors." See Les Carbeau v.
Rodrigues, 286 A.2d 246, 248 (R.I. 1972). Therefore, the policies supporting serving the
deceased's successor are not present in this case because the decedent's successor, even
though she had actual notice of the decedent's death, did not bear the burden of moving
the court for a substitution. Plaintiff, the party with the burden of substituting a person for
the deceased defendant, received notice of the Suggestion of Death.9

or representatives, however, are not and never were parties to this action and therefore were not
subject to Rule 13's compulsory counterclaim provision. Moreover, even if Defendant's
successors or representatives could be considered as part of the lawsuit, a dismissal for failure to
substitute a party within the 90 days under Rule 25 would not bar those parties from later
initiating their own action. Rule 13 speaks ofpleadings, not motions; thus, a party must assert a
counterclaim or cross-claim "arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter
of the opposing party's claim" in a responsive pleading, such as an Answer to a complaint. A
motion to dismiss does not trigger Rule 13's mandatory provisions.
9

Even if this Court determines that Rule 25 requires that the Suggestion of Death be
served upon "nonparties" in the same manner as the Motion for Substitution, the fact that
Defendant's representatives did not serve themselves with notice of Defendant's death does not
invalidate the actual notice Plaintiff received. Rule 25 states that a Motion for Substitution "shall
be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner
provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons." Essentially, this language contemplates service
upon two separate types of persons: "parties" and persons "not parties." Thus, a party or
representative should serve the Motion for Substitution and, arguably, the Suggestion of Death
upon parties to trigger the ninety days, and, if the party of representative wishes, he or she should
also serve nonparties pursuant to rule 4. Nevertheless, the failure to serve nonparties does not
invalidate the actual notice received by the plaintiff. At most, the failure to serve nonparties simply
means that the ninety days does not run against them. Actual notice to a party—in this case,
Plaintiff—triggers the ninety days as to that party, regardless of any lack of notice to another
party or nonparty.
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Moreover, "[i]n interpreting rules, [Utah appellate courts] use the general
principles of statutory construction." Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App.
2000) (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997)). Thus, rules are to be
viewed "as a whole rather than in a piecemeal fashion." Id. As this Court recently
recognized, "c[o]ne of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.'" In re Gonzalez, 387
Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 2000 UT 28, No. 970521, 2000 WL 88111 (Jan. 28, 2000) (quoting
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs argument does not make sense when the Rule is read as a whole.
He contends that because Rule 25 specifies that only persons "not parties" shall be served
according to Rule 5, Defendant's representatives should have served themselves. The
logical extension of this argument means that the entire world would need to be served
with the Suggestion of Death—and the Motion for Substitution, for that matter. This
certainly cannot be what the Rule requires. A better construction of the Rule limits the
meaning of "persons not parties" to those individuals against whom the party or
representative serving notice wishes to trigger the ninety days. This reading is completely
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consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes for Federal Rule 25, which state that "[i]f
a party or the representative of the deceased party desires to limit the time within which
another may make the motion [to substitute a party], he may do so by suggesting the
death upon the record." See supra Point II.A. This Court should therefore hold that actual
notice served upon a party or nonparty is effective to trigger the ninety days for that party
or nonparty to make a motion for substitution under Rule 25.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME.
Plaintiff accounts error to the trial court's decision not to grant Plaintiff
additional time in which to move to substitute parties. This Court reviews a denial of a
motion for an extension of time for an abuse of discretion. See Crosslandv. Hatch, 877
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs motion to enlarge because the
limitations period under Rule 25 had already expired, and Plaintiff could not demonstrate
"excusable neglect" for his failure to file the motion.
First, it was no abuse of discretion to deny Plaintiffs motion for an
extension of time under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the
ninety-day limitation under Rule 25 had already expired. As explained in the above
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arguments, counsel for the deceased filed a valid Suggestion of Death with the trial court
on December 24, 1998. The ninety-day limitation period was triggered on that date.
Plaintiff, however, did not file a motion for an extension of time until April 5, 1999,
which was 97 days after the limitation period began and seven days after it ended. Rule
25 states that u[u]nless the motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days after
the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as
provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party." U.R.C.P. 25(a). This language is not permissive. Plaintiff admits that he
failed to act within the ninety-day period imposed by Rule 25. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
motion was untimely, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
an extension of time on that basis.10
Plaintiff has argued that his failure to timely file a Motion for Substitution
was excusable neglect; therefore, Plaintiff contends, the trial court should have granted
him additional time in which to file the motion. As an excuse, plaintiff explains that it
was "inadvertence of counsel and the press of other matters."Although that argument may

10

Whether Defendant "lain in wait for all of these events to transpire," as Plaintiff alleges,
is truly Defendant's prerogative. He was, after all, a defendant.
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have merit where a five or ten day filing deadline is at issue, it is not adequate where
plaintiff had ninety days in which to respond to the Suggestion of Death with his Motion.
In the matter of Cloyd v. Andersen & Company, Inc., 25 F.3d 1056 (10th
Cir. (Utah) 1994), the Court recognized
"that a finding of excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(2) requires both
a demonstration of good faith by the parties seeking the enlargement
and also it must appear that there was a reasonable basis for not
complying within the specified period."
Id. (quoting In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 493 F.2d 1288,1290 (10th Cir. 1974)).
In the later case ofHilterman v. Furlong, 161 F.3d 17 (10th Cir. 1998), the
Tenth Circuit interpreted excusable neglect as applied to the filing of a motion for relief
from judgment under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 The court
reasoned that
A finding of excusable neglect is dependent "on the facts of each
case in which the question arises." Fault in the delay is a "very
important factor—perhaps the most important single factor in
determining whether neglect is excusable. Ignorance or carelessness
of an attorney is generally not cognizable under Fed R. Civ. P.
60(b)."
Id. (citations omitted).

11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 is similar to Utah's Rule 60.
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In this case, Plaintiff not only has failed to demonstrate a reasonable basis
for not complying with the specified period but also has failed to demonstrate that his
claim has any merit. Instead, he pleads inadvertence of counsel, the press of other
matters and the relative obscurity of Rule 25 requirements. Furthermore, his attempts to
pass blame to Defendant Smith for holding Plaintiff to a standard set by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure should not be permitted.
Second, the trial court specifically found that Plaintiff did not show
excusable neglect for failure to substitute within ninety days under Rule 25. The trial
court conducted a thorough analysis under the excusable neglect standard for Rule 60(b)
as set forth in West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340-41 (Utah 1997), and concluded
that the factors of good faith, prejudice to the nonmoving party, the reason for the delay,
and the length of the delay, all did not weigh in Plaintiffs favor. See id (citing Pioneer
Inv. Servs. Co. v. BurnswickAssoc, 507 U.S. 380, 295, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1498, 123 L.
Ed.2d 74 (1993); City ofChanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046
(10th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, the trial court, within its discretion, denied Plaintiffs
motion.
Plaintiff argues there was absolutely no possibility of prejudice to
Defendant had the trial court granted Plaintiffs motion. Not true. Defendant would have
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been required to incur additional expenses and costs in defending against Plaintiffs
claims.
Plaintiff also asserts that granting the motion would have produced "no
delay" and that nine days was not a delay in the judicial proceedings. To the contrary,
nine days was a delay, not to mention the additional delay for Plaintiff to prepare and file
the necessary motion.
The reason for the delay, Plaintiff asserts, was also justified; however, the
trial court properly rejected this argument. Important to the trial court's analysis was the
fact that Plaintiff did not advance any other reason, other than his counsel was busy
during the relevant time period, to support his assertions of good faith and excuses for the
delay. Addressing the good faith of Plaintiff, the trial court found that:
Plaintiff has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why
there was no filing of a substitution of parties, or at least a
request to extend the time for filing such a substitution, within
the 90 day period. The Court cannot conclude that the delay
in filing the statutorily required motion for substitution of
parties was made in good faith in the absence of such
explanation. It appears that plaintiff simply put this case on
the back burner because there were more pressing matters
pending and chose to let the 90 day period lapse.
Memorandum Decision, p. 5 (R. 144-176).
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Likewise, Plaintiffs only reason for the delay was "'because of the
inadvertence of counsel and the press of other matters."5 Id. at 6 (quoting Plaintiffs
Supporting Memorandum, p. 3). This explanation was insufficient for the trial court to
justify Plaintiffs tardiness infilingthe motion. See id. The trial court further concluded
that "[i]f Rule 25 is to have any meaning, the Court cannot just disregard its provisions at
will. In the absence of a satisfactory reason for the delay, the court declines to consider
even the most brief delay by Plaintiff to be insubstantial or insignificant." Id. at 7.
This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff offered no material
reason for not satisfying the ninety-day requirement of Rule 25. Such an excuse does not
rise to the level of "excusable neglect" required under Rule 6(b) or Rule 60. See, e.g.,
Doyle v. Rice Ranch Oil Co., SI P.2d 980 (Cal. 1938); Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661
P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1983) (holding mere inconvenience or press of business or personal
matters does not constitute excusable neglect for failure to appear at trial); Farmers Ins.
Group v. District Court of the Second Judicial District of Denver, 507 P.2d 865, 867
(Colo. 1973) ("Failure to act due to carelessness and negligence is not excusable
neglect.")
The court concluded that setting aside the default judgment was proper
when the interests of justice demanded such action. See id. at 371. Noting that the
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prefatory language to Rule 60(b) conditions relief "upon such terms as are just," the court
reasoned that its ruling was justified when "there is a reasonable justification or excuse
for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is made to set [the
default judgment] aside." Id.
What is lacking in this case, however, is "a reasonable justification or
excuse" for Plaintiffs nonaction. Plaintiff had actual notice of Defendant's death.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs counsel did absolutely nothing to pursue Plaintiffs claims during
the ninety-day period after receiving the notice of death. Counsel also did not take any
action to substitute a party for the deceased until after a Motion to Dismiss was filed. The
trial court was well within its sound discretion and appropriately denied Plaintiffs afterthe-fact request for an extension. See Agla, 611 P.2d at 372 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("It has .
. . been held that simple carelessness does not rise to the statutory standard, nor do simple
business difficulties which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate attention to the
litigation in question."). Accordingly, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its
discretion.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that because a "personal representative was not
appointed until June 2, 1999, the deceased Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of
Plaintiff not moving for substitution." Plaintiff further argues that an absence of a
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personal representative made it "impossible for Plaintiff to have substituted the personal
representative within 90 days of December 28, 1998." Br. of Plaintiff, p. 41.
Even if these statements were accurate, it by no means precluded Plaintiff
from pursuing his action. As explained above, Plaintiff had every opportunity to file a
Motion for an Enlargement of Time under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
if he encountered difficulty in naming a substitute party. Plaintiff did not file such a
motion because he wasn't even looking for a substitute party. There has been no showing
here or before the trial court of any effort by Plaintiff to identify a substitute prior to the
expiration of Rule 25 's ninety-day period.
Furthermore, Rule 25 does not require a decedent's estate to name a
personal representative within ninety days after the Suggestion of Death has been filed.
To read the Rule otherwise would mean that Rule 25 requires Defendant's estate to
affirmatively assist Plaintiff in pursuing an action against it. See Unicorn Tales, Inc. v.
Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467, 470 (2nd Cir. 1998). That is not the purpose of the Rule, and no
language in the Rule supports that construction.
Plaintiff insists that because the deceased Defendant suffered no prejudice,
Plaintiff should be forgiven for failure to comply with Rule 25. This Court should reject
such a notion. Excusable neglect requires more than the absence of prejudice. It requires
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a showing that a party's failure to comply with civil procedure rules stems from a real and
substantial emergency. Thus, the trial court was completely within its discretion when it
found that, "although there has been no showing of prejudice to the non-moving party,
the length of the delay, the absence of a showing of good faith, and most importantly the
lack of a satisfactory reason for the delay all combine to require the Court to rule in favor
of Defendant Seth Smith." Memorandum Decision, p. 7 (R. 144-176). Moreover,
prejudice does exist in that decedent's heirs and estate are entitled to rely upon Rule 25 in
the management and settlement of the estate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision
to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. The plain language of Rule 25 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allowed Defendant's counsel, after being notified of
Defendant's death and upon consent of Defendant's estate, to submit a Suggestion of
Death. Under the Rule, counsel did not need to specify a substitute party in the
Suggestion nor did he need to serve the Suggestion on Defendant's own successors and
representative. In any event, counsel had authority from Defendant's representative to act
on behalf of the estate.
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The trial court was correct to deny Plaintiffs Motion for an Extension of
Time. Plaintiff produced no evidence to show excusable neglect existed justified his
failure to act within the statutory limitation period. As such, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion to deny Plaintiffs Motion.
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling
in this matter.
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P.O. Box 2465
Salt lake City, Uuh S4110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
AFFIDAVIT OF PHYLLIS MYERS
PUintiff;
VS.

Civil No. 98CV102
Judge Philip Eves

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

1

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF ^ E » Q a t , )
Phyllis Myers, beingfirstduly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My father was the defendant in the above-entitled matter at the time of his

death in December 1998.
2.

Although I have not seen any legal document to tlie effect, I understand that

the Court recently appointsd me Personal Representative of my father's estate.

3.

A* Personal Representative of my father's estate, I approved and consented

to S. Eeird Morgan and the lawfirmof Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing the interest
of the estate in this matter.
4.

At the time ofrayfather's death, I was aware that he end my mother had

created a tnist. However, I had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document Additionally,
neither my brothers nor I knew whether my father left a will,
5.

My mother is incapacitated and ia incapable of participating in any aspect of

the legal proceedings involving my father's estate.
6.

My brothers arid I knew that we were co-trustees of my father and mother's

trusts. However, we did not know whether myfetherhad also appointed a personal representative
of his estate.
7.

In December 1998,1 called Mr. Morgan and informed him of my fiithar's

death. At tha time of my father's pasaing, my brothm and [ knew and consented to Mr. Morgan
notifying the Court and parties of his death, We understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan would
continue to represent the interest of my father's estate and me as Personal Representative with
respect to the two lawsuits.
DATED this SSL

6 y of

QS.~*J?^

1999.

PHYUJ^YERS

2

/

fl

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF

)

fesAoeai-

^
, 1999, personally appeared before me,
On the ZV^day
of THL A A V J U
PhyUiA Myers, whose identity has been proven on the baais of satisfactory evidence, being first
duly sworn, acknowledges that she executed the fbregomg instrument, for the purposes stated
therein, of her own voluntary act.

r>>^s

MlChAEl F DALTON

^
.4C7W °03L!C 'SWtoWJM
• i*i 860 NORTH 100 WEST
V
J/J BiFAVFR. UT 84713

" ' C0M« EXP 10-10-2001

NOTARY PUBLIC
Mjy Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SEBYICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this
day of June, 1999 to the following:
Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North St
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM "B

S. BAIRD MORGAN (A2314)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

vs.
SETH ALBERT SMITH and DAVID R.
STODDARD,
Defendant.

Civil No. 98CVI02
Judge: J. Philip Eves

A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the Honorable J. Philip Eves
on May 12, 1999. A hearing on Plaintiffs Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider, or Alternatively, Rule
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Error of Law and Plaintiffs Joinder in Stoddard's
Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend the Findings and Conclusions came before the Honorable J. Philip Eves

J. Philip Eves on September 22, 1999. Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Phyllis Meyers, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant also came before the Court on
September 22, 1999. The Court also heard arguments in the companion case of David Stoddard v.
Seth Albert Smith, Civil No. 980500125. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, having
reviewed the pleadings on file and being otherwise duly informed, now rules as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted based on Plaintiffs failure to

comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court prepared a Memorandum Decision which
provides the relevant facts, legal arguments, and analysis underlying the Court's decision. A copy
of the Court's Memorandum Decision from the May 12, 1999 hearing is attached hereto as
Exhibit 4 T f and expressly incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

Plaintiff s Motion pursuant to Rule 54(6) and/or Rule 59(e) to Alter or Amend

the Findings and Conclusions is denied. The Court issued a ruling which identifies the facts,
analysis and legal arguments underlying the Court's decision. A copy of the Court's ruling from the
September 22, 1999 hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
3.

Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Phyllis Meyers as Personal Representative of

the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant is denied. The facts and legal arguments relied upon
in reaching this decision are incorporated in the Court's ruling. (See Exhibit "2").

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND
ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Seth Albert Smith be and is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

3>

, #000 •
day ooflQctober, 1#99
BY THE COURT:

J. PHILIP EVES
Jistrict Court Judge

AS TO FORM:

CRAIG M) SNYDER
Attorneys for Plaintiff

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed,
first-class, postage prepaid, on this / ^ t ^ d a y of December, 1999 to the following:

Craig M. Snyder
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
P.O. Box 1248
120 East 300 North
Provo, UT 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff

14041-0016
273548
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EXHIBIT "1"

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
V.

SETH ALBERT SMITH and DAVID R.
STODDARD,
Defendants.

Civ. No. 980500102
Judge J. Philip Eves

This case comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss, filed Apr. 1, 1999, on behalf
of Defendant Seth Albert Smith who is deceased. On April 5, 1999, Plaintiff Brian Keith
Donahue responded by filing a Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time, along with a Memorandum
Opposing Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for
Extension of Time. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in
Opposition of [sic] Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time was subsequently filed on Apr. 14,
1999. Finally, a Reply Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of
Time was filed on Apr. 22, 1999. A hearing regarding the two motions occurred May 12, 1999.
Having reviewed the parties memoranda, having heard oral argument, and having
reviewed relevant law, the Court now rules as follows:

BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from the death of 88 year-old Defendant Seth Smith on Dec. 23, 1998.
Subsequent to Mr. Smith's death, the counsel of record for the decedent filed a Suggestion of
Death with the Court and mailed a copy to opposing counsel on Dec. 28, 1998, in accordance
with Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Ninety four days later, on Apr. 1, 1999, counsel for Defendant
filed the present Motion to Dismiss, based on Plaintiffs failure to file a substitution of parties
within the 90 day time frame contained in Rule 25(a)(1).
ANALYSIS
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) provides as follows:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party
or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party . . . . Unless the motion
for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the
record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein fcr the
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.

The Rule raises at least three issues relevant to the Court's determination in this case.
Those issues are: (1) Does the "shall" language contained in Rule 25 prevent the Court from
considering Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time; (2) If not, has Plaintiff sufficiently
demonstrated excusable neglect to justify such an extension; and (3) if the Court does order
dismissal, is it "with" or "without" prejudice?
The Court now considers each issue in turn.
1. Rule 25
Utah R. Civ. P. 25 is based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 25, and contains language which is
"substantially similar" to the Federal Rule. ( See Utah R. Civ. P. 25 compiler's note.) Therefore
analysis of the advisory committee's note to the Federal Rule is relevant to and helpful in the
Court's initial determination in this matter. The Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note
[citations omitted] provides as follows:
2

The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not
upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is provided
by means of a suggestion of death upon the record, i.e. service of a statement of the
fact of death. The Motion may not be made later than 90 days after the service of the
statement unless the period is extended pursuant to Rule 6(b), as amended.

The advisory committee's note [citations omitted] continues:
. . . The only limitation of time provided for in amended Rule 25 is the 90-day period
following a suggestion upon the record of the death of a party within which to make a
motion to substitute the proper parties for the deceased party. It is intended that the
court shall have discretion to enlarge that period. (Emphasis added)

The Utah Supreme Court has applied this Federal standard to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in the decision of Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976). In addressing the issue of
dismissal under Rule 25, the Court said:
"Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that for good
cause shown, the court may order an enlargement of time for any act which is by
the rules required to be performed within a specified time."
The Supreme Court then denied relief on appeal because M[t]he plaintiff never asked the court for
any enlargement of the 90 days in which to move for a substitution of parties," as well as on the
basis that the motion for substitution had not been brought within the required 90 days. (Id. at
1337-1338.)
In the present case, the Plaintiff failed to bring a motion for the substitution of parties
within the 90 day period required by Rule 25. In addition there was no motion to enlarge the
time for making the substitution of parties within the 90 day period. However, the court now
holds that the "shall" language contained in Rule 25 does not automatically prevent this Court
from considering Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of time. Consequently, the Court now
considers Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion.
2. Rule 6
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) provides as follows:

When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an
act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause
shown may at any time in its discretion . . . permit the act to be done where the failure to
act was the result of excusable n e g l e c t . . . .

The Court is aware of no Utah case law which specifically addresses excusable neglect under
Rule 6(b)(2). However, the standard applied by Federal courts in addressing excusable neglect
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) is similar to the standard used by Utah Courts in addressing
excusable neglect under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). [ See Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation v.
Bank of America. 493 F.2d 1288, 1290-1291 (10th Cir. 1974)(citmg 4 Wright & Miller Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1165 (1969)(weighing factors of good faith, prejudice and
reasonableness of excuse in determining excusable neglect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2));
compare West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 340-341 (Utah 1997)(weighing factors of good
faith, prejudice, reason for the delay, and length of the delay in determining excusable neglect
under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)] Therefore, this Court will apply the standard of excusable neglect
used by the Utah Supreme Court in making determinations under Rule 60(b), and weigh the
factors of (A) good faith, (B) prejudice, (C) reason for delay, and (D) length of delay.
A. Good Faith
Plaintiff argues that he in asking for an extension of the time to file a substitution of
parties, he is "clearly is acting in good faith, given the nine days that have elapsed since the
deadline passed and the one day that has passed between the time of service (April 1, 1999) and
the date of [his] motion [for extension of time]." See Memorandum Opposing Defendant
Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time, p. 4
[herinafter Plaintiffs Memo in Opposition].
In response, counsel for Defendant Smith asserts that Plaintiffs argument might "have
merit where a five or ten day filing deadline is at issue, [but the argument] is not adequate where
plaintiff had ninety days in which to respond to the Suggestion of Death with his motion." See
4

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to dismiss and in Opposition of [sic] Plaintiffs
Motion for Extension of Time, p. 2 [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply Memo].
The Court agrees with the position expressed by counsel for Defendant Smith. The issue
at hand is not how promptly Plaintiff filed his Motion for Extension of Time after receiving
notice of Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss. Rather, the issue at hand relates to Plaintiffs
good faith in waiting 99 days to take action on the Suggestion of Death, which was provided to
Plaintiff in December of last year. Plaintiff has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why
there was no filing of a substitution of parties, or at least a request to extend the time for filing
such a substitution, within the 90 day period. The Court cannot conclude that the delay in filing
the statutorily required motion for substitution of parties was made in good faith in the absence
of such explanation. It rather appears that plaintiff simply put this case on the back burner
because there were more pressing matters pending and chose to let the 90 day period lapse.
B. Prejudice
In addressing "the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party," ( See West, supra)
Plaintiff argues that "[s]imply put, there is no prejudice to the defendant in granting this motion."
( See Defendant's Memo in Opposition, p. 3.) Plaintiffs argument continues, "Defendant can
only point to an inconsequential nine-day delay that it made no attempt to cure. Plaintiff on the
other hand, loses his entire cause of action. Denying plaintiffs motion for extension of time
would therefore be grossly disproportionate and unfair." (Id. at 4.)
Counsel for Defendant has not argued the issue of prejudice. And, given the fact that
Defendant has passed away, the Court is hard put to envision any prejudice which the defendant
himself would suffer if the extension of the 90 day time limit for substitution of parties was
granted. The only prejudice which the Court can envision relates to the potential delay which
further litigation may cause in the probate of Decedent's estate and the delay of this case while
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the 99 days has run since the Suggestion of Death was filed. It seems plain to the Court that the
purpose of the 90 day requirement in Rule 25 is to avoid such delay in the probate process, as
well as the proceedings in the pending civil case However, given the apparent intent of the
Federal advisory committee in making allowance for the extension of the 90 day deadline in
some circumstances, as discussed above, the Court cannot rely upon any such speculative
prejudice to decedent's heirs. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that he would be
particularly prejudiced in this case by the granting of the Motion to extend the time for filing the
substitution of parties.
C. Reason for Delay
Plaintiffs only justification for the delay is based on his assertion that "[t]he motion was
not filed earlier because of the inadvertence of counsel and the press of other matters." (£ee
Plaintiffs Support Memo, p. 3.)
In response, Counsel for Defendant argues that Plaintiffs "plea[]s [of] inadvertence of
counsel, [and] the press of other matters . . . fail to demonstrate a reasonable basis for not
complying with the specified period . . . . " ( See Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 3.)
"[F]ault in the delay is a very important factor—perhaps the most important single factor
in determining whether neglect is excusable[, and i]gnorance or carelessness of an attorney is
generally not cognizable" as an excuse. [ See Hilterman v. Furlong, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
22159 at *6-7 (10lh Cir. Sep. 11, 1998)]. Consequently, the Court concludes that in the absence
of any statement of reason for the delay, other than the busy schedule of Counsel, the court must
conclude that there is no justification for the tardy motion requesting an extension of time in this
case.
D. Length of Delay
In this case the plaintiff failed to file a substitution of parties within the 90 day period
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contemplated by Rule 25. The plaintiff likewise failed to seek an extension of the time for such a
filing until the defendant had already filed a motion to dismiss the suit against the deceased
party. While it is true that the delay was brief, about 9 days, the delay was not insignificant, in
view of the fact that the plaintiff had 90 days to address the issue and did nothing.
Plaintiff has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation regarding the reason for its delay,
and if Rule 25 is to have any meaning, the Court cannot just disregard its provisions at will. In
the absence of a satisfactory reason for the delay, the court declines to consider even the most
brief delay by Plaintiff to be insubstantial or insignificant. Consequently, the Court finds that the
99 days which Plaintiff waited to act must be weighed against him in deciding the pending
issues.
E. Weighing the Results
In weighing the results of the four-pronged test applied above, the Court finds that
although there has been no showing of prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of the delay,
the absence of a showing of good faith, and most importantly the lack of a satisfactory reason for
the delay all combine to require the Court to rule in favor of Defendant Seth Smith, and against
Plaintiff Brian Keith Donahue on the pending Motions. Accordingly, the Motion seeking an
extension of time must be denied and the Motion seeking dismissal against the deceased party
must be granted.
3. Dismissal "with"or "without"prejudice
The final issue to be determined is whether the action against Defendant Smith should be
dismissed with or without prejudice. In pertinent part, Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides as follows:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. . .
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
7

The term "dismissal with prejudice" operates as an adjudication on the merits. It is a term which
by definition means that there has been such "an adjudication on the merits, and [that] a final
disposition [has been entered], barring the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim
or cause. It is res judicata as to every matter litigated." See Black's Law Dictionary 325 (abr. 6th
ed. 1991). By contrast, the term "dismissal without prejudice" is generally used in association
with an adjudication which was not on the merits. "The effect of the words 'without prejudice' is
to prevent the decree of dismissal from operating as a bar to a subsequent suit." Id.
In the present case, there is no indication that anything other than an adjudication on the
merits is appropriate in this case. The Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant Smith is not
based upon any "lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue," or "lack of an indispensable party."
[See Rule 41(b).] Rather, the Motion to Dismiss is based upon the "failure of the plaintiff to .. .
comply with the[] rules [of civil procedure]." (Id.) Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss is based
upon Plaintiffs failure "to file a motion for substitution of parties within the required time
frame" under Rule 25. ( See Defendant's Support Memo, p. 2.) Consequently, the Court finds
that the dismissal should be with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time is hereby
denied. Furthermore, deceased Defendant Seth Albert Smith's Motion to Dismiss is hereby
granted. The claims of the plaintiff against the deceased defendant are dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law cited above.

ORDER
Counsel for Defendant Smith is directed to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an
order dismissing the claim against Defendant Smith with prejudice, and submit it to opposing
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counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated this / "

day of M&y, 1999.

/fi/..-fi.'?.

^AJ-C4-~

J.fflILIPEVES/V
STRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on this _j

day of May, 1999 I provided true and correct copies of the

foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the attorneys named below by placing a
copy in the United States Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Craig M. Snyder
PO Box 1248
Provo UT 84603
Baird S. Morgan
PO Box 2465
SLC UT84110

DEPUTY CLERK o F t H E COURT
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EXHIBIT "2"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 980500102

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs "Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider, or
Alternatively, Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Error of Law," filed with a
supporting memorandum on July 9, 1999. The motion was filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with a
"Joinder in Stoddard's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions," filed on
June 16, 1999. An "Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion" was filed by Defendant on
June 30, 1999. A hearing on the two motions occurred September 22, 1999. The plaintiff was
represented by Phillip Lowry, attorney of record. The defendant Smith was represented by S. Baird
Morgan, attorney of record. The defendant Stoddard was represented by Brent Young, attorney of
record.
Also before the Court is a "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant," filed by Plaintiff with a supporting memorandum on
July 9,1999. An "Objection to Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Seth Albert Smith" was filed by Defendant on July 26,1999. A hearing on the matter also
occurred on September 22, 1999.

This case was argued in conjunction with the companion case of Stoddard v. Smith, case
number 980500125. The issues raised by the parties in this case are the same as those raised in the
Stoddard case. Likewise, the facts are identical. However, in this case the court has not yet signed an
Order dismissing the case with prejudice because an Objection was filed by the Plaintiff to the
proposed Order prepared by Defendant's counsel Likewise, no appeal has yet been filed in this case.
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda, exhibits and affidavits, having reviewed relevant
law, and having heard oral argument, the Court now rules in this case in the same fashion as it ruled
in the Stoddard case. The court incorporates, by this reference, the Stoddard ruling in this Ruling.
The Stoddard ruling will be attached hereto.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS
The Plaintiffs Motion under Rule 54 for reconsideration of the court's previous
Memorandum Decision is hereby denied. The Plaintiffs Motion to substitute Ms. Meyers as the
party defendant is this case is likewise denied. The Objection of the Plaintiff to the proposed Order
based on the court's Memorandum Decision is granted. Counsel for the Defendant is to submit to
this court for signature a revised Order of Dismissal, in keeping with the court's previous
Memorandum Decision and Rulings in this and the Stoddard cases. That Order of Dismissal is to
incorporate by reference and have attached the previous Memorandum Decision in this case, the
Ruling in the Stoddard case and this Ruling, which documents contain the reasoning of this court in
making its decision.
DATED this 12th day of October 1999.

<7(fc

jgctif

J. PHILtfP EVES, District Court Judge

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of October 1999,1 mailed true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Brent D. Young, Esq.
IVIE & YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84604
S. Baird Morgan, Esq.
Krista A. Weber, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, 7,h Floor
P.O. Box 2456
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Craig M. Snyder, Esq.
Phillip E. Lowry, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603

Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID R. STODDARD,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 980500125 PI

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs "Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or
Amend the Findings and Conclusions," filed with a supporting memorandum on June 7, 1999.
Defendant's "Objection to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and
Conclusions" wasfiledon June 21, 1999, and a "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions" was filed by Plaintiff on July
6, 1999. A hearing on the motion occurred September 22, 1999. The Plaintiff was represented
by Brent D. Young, attorney of record. The Defendant was represented by S. Baird Morgan,
attorney of record.
Also before the Court is a "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant," filed with a supporting
memorandum on July 6, 1999. An "Objection to Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith" wasfiledby Defendant on July 26, 1999. A
hearing on the matter also occurred on September 22,1999.
This case is a companion case to Donahue v. Smith and Stoddard, case number
980500102. This issues presented in the two cases are identical. The facts are nearly identical in

all respects relevant to the issues presented by the pending Motions. Therefore, it is the intent of
the court that this Ruling apply to both the Stoddard and Donahue cases.
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda, exhibits and affidavits, having reviewed
relevant law, and having heard oral argument, the Court now rules as follows:

BACKGROUND
The present dispute is rooted in the Court's Aug. 4, 1999, memorandum decision and
subsequent order dismissing Plaintiffs personal injury claim against defendant Seth Albert
Smith, after Defendant's death on Dec. 23, 1999. The dismissal was based upon Plaintiffs
failure to file a motion for substitution of parties within 90 days after thefilingon the record in
this case of a Suggestion of Death under Utah R. Civ. P. 25, and the Court's finding that an
extension of the 90 day deadline for filing a Motion To Substitute was unjustified under Utah R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(2) based on Plaintiffs failure to show the Court that the failure to comply with Rule
25 was based on "excusable neglect." See Court's previous Memorandum Opinion, pp. 1-2.
S. Baird Morgan, Counsel for Defendant, filed the Suggestion of Death on Dec. 28,
1999, after being informed of Defendant's death by Defendant's daughter, Phyllis Myers. "At
the time of [Defendant's passing, [Ms. Meyers and her brothers] knew and consented to Mr.
Morgan notifying the Court and parties of his death. [Ms. Myers and her brothers] understood
and agreed that Mr. Morgan would continue to represent the interest of [Defendant]'s estate and
[Ms. Myers] as Personal Representative

" See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, pp. 1-2.

A copy of the Suggestion of Death was mailed to Plaintiff Stoddard. The Suggestion of
Death was not served upon Ms. Meyers, the personal representative of Defendant's estate. See
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Memorandum in Support of Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and
Conclusions, pp. 6-9 [hereinafter Amendment Support Memo].
ANALYSIS
The Court will first address Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The Court will then discuss
Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute. However, the Court will not revisit the issue of excusable
neglect within this Ruling. A full analysis has already been provided by the Court in its former
Opinion in this case, including a review of relevant Utah k J and afindingthat there is an
insufficient basis under Rule 6(b)(2) for extension of the 90 day deadline for substitution of
parties set out in Rule 25.
1. Motion to Amend
Plaintiff argues that the dismissal of his case against Defendant should be reversed under
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) based on a mistake of law made by the Court—the mistake being that
because "[a] formal, valid Suggestion of Death has not been made on the record, therefore the
ninety-day limitations period has not yet begun to run." .See Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions, pp. 3-7 [hereinafter
Amendment Reply Memo]. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Suggestion of Deathfiledby
counsel for Defendant (1) "is not valid because the lawfirmdid not, and in fact could not,
represent Defendant when the Suggestion wasfiledbecause Defendant had died;" (2) that "[t]he
Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm is not valid because it was not served on Defendant's
representatives;" and (3) that "Rule 25 implicitly requires that the suggestion of death identify
who may be substituted as a party." Id. See also Amendment Support Memo, p. 9.
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In response, Defendant argues that "[t]o prohibit an attorney from alerting the court and
counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. The more persuasive
reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to notify the Court and
other parties in the action that his client has died." See Objection to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e)
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions, pp. 4-5 [hereinafter Defendant's
Objection to Amendment]. Defendant also argues that "Rule 25 does not state that a Suggestion
of Death must identify a person to be substituted as a party," and the absence of Federal Form 30
(which contains such a requirement) from the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further indicates an
intent on the part of the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the Personal
Representative need not be named in the Suggestion of Death. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendant also
argues that "nothing in Rule 25 suggests that the suggestion of death must be served upon the
Decedent's Representatives," and that u[w]hether the defendant's successor is served with formal
notice does not effect the plaintiffs claim." Id. at 6-8.
A. Defendant's Death
Plaintiff first argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by the counsel for the deceased
defendant is not valid because the agency relationship between the defendant and his attorney
ended with the death. In deciding the issue of whether Defendant's death severed the attorneyclient relationship between Mr. Morgan and Mr. Smith, and in the absence of any relevant Utah
authority, this Court finds that there is a split in authority in other jurisdictions. This split pits
the sagacity of the Supreme Court of Colorado against that of the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas. Though the evaluations provided by both courts are interesting, for the

4

reasons stated below the Court finds the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado to be the
more well-reasoned, and more applicable to the present conflict.
In Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516 (Dist. Kan. 1991)[hereinafter
Fehrenbacher] a patient, Fehrenbacher, sued a doctor, Quackenbush, for negligent prescription of
drugs. The doctor died during the pendency of the action, however, and after the plaintiff failed
to respond to a suggestion of death as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a), counsel for the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss. The Federal court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning in part that
"[t]he attorney for the deceased party may not make the suggestion of death since he is not
himself a party to the action and, since his authority to represent the deceased terminated on the
death, he is not a representative of the deceased party of the sort contemplated by [Rule 25]." Id.
at 1518 (citations omitted).
In Farmers Ins. Gr. v. Dist. Court of Sec. J.D.. 507 P.2d 865 (Colo 1973)[hereinafter
Farmers Ins.]. despite the fact that the plaintiff in a tort action failed to move for substitution of
parties within 90 days of the service of notification of death upon the plaintiffs attorneys as
required by Colo. R. Civ. P. 25(a), the trial court refused to dismiss the action. On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the ruling, and stated, "[i]n our view, an
attorney for a deceased defendant has a duty to notify the court and the other parties in the action
that his client has died." Id. at 867.
In analysis of the two rulings, this Court reviews Model Rule of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.3 cmt. [3], which provides as follows:
Unless the [attorney-client] relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16
[addressing whether an attorney must terminate representation because of crime or
fraud], a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If
a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when
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the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period
in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to
serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal.

It is apparent to the Court that the Rules of Professional Responsibility contemplate that
an attorney will finish the work which he has started, and terminate the relationship only "when
the matter has been resolved." Id. Although there are obvious practical limitations to an
attorney's ability to represent a deceased client, it seems to the Court that Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] at
least would allow an attorney to notify the adverse party of the death of his client. Again, as
counsel for Defendant persuasively articulates, u[t]o prohibit an attorney from alerting the court
and counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. The more persuasive
reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to notify the Court and
other parties in the action that his client has died." See Defendant's Objection to Amendment,
pp. 4-5. Consequently, in keeping with such public policy, and also in keeping with the rules of
professional responsibility, the Court cannot find the Suggestion of Death to be invalid upon the
basis that the attorney for the dead party cannot file a valid Suggestion of Death under Rule 25.
The plaintiffs Motion is denied on that ground.
There is an additional reason for denying the Motion of the Plaintiff on the point that the
lawyer for the deceased Defendant cannot properly file a Suggestion of Death. At the time the
Suggestion of Death was filed in this case, S. Baird Morgan was acting both as attorney for the
Defendant and as attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative. Clearly he had
actual authority to file the Suggestion of Death, independent of any agency relationship with the
deceased party.
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B. Identification of the Personal Representative
The plaintiff next argues that the Suggestion of Deathfiledby Mr. Morgan is invalid
because it does not identify the personal representative of the deceased party's estate. In analysis
of this second issue, the Court again contrasts the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Colorado
against that of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. In Rehrenbacher.
supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519, the Federal Kansas court noted that "Rule 25 does not explicitly
require the party making the suggestion of death to identify the decedent's representative." The
Court further reasoned, however, that u[i]n reality, Rule 25 implicitly imposes such a
requirement. By requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties, the rule
implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party making the
suggestion of death." id.
In contrast to this view, in Farmer's Ins.. supra. 507 P.2d at 867, the Colorado court
stated:
. . . we see nothing in our rules which could reasonably be a basis for requiring that
notification of death of a defendant should include the identity of the deceased
defendant's executor, administrator, or representative. It seems quite basic and
reasonable that a plaintiffs attorney who receives notification of the defendant's death
has the responsibility to promptly initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the
identity of a person to be substituted for the deceased defendant, and to file a motion for
substitution in accordance with our rules of Civil Procedure.

In analysis of the two arguments, this Courtfindsthe reasoning of the Colorado Court to
be more in keeping with the Utah Rules of CiviTProcedure and sound practice. After a careful
review of Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a), the Court is unable tofindthat the Utah Rule in any way
explicitly or "implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party
making the suggestion of death." .See Rehrenbacher, supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519. Rather, the
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Rule simply requires that there be a Suggestion of Death upon the record. This court is of the
opinion that it is more reasonable that the responsibility of determining the identity of the person
to be substituted should rest with the Plaintiffs attorney, who possesses the greater incentive to
preserve the claim, and who is already required under Rule 25(a) to file the motion for
substitution. Once someone becomes aware that the defendant has died, that person may not
know if there is, or will ever be, a personal representative. If a probate case is to be commenced
to identify a representative for the deceased party's estate, it seems reasonable to this court that
the responsibility for pursuing that action should rest with the party pursuing the claim. It would
be poor logic to require that no one can suggest that a party has died without first launching a
probate case to have the personal representative appointed. Rule 25 does not contain any such
requirement. Consequently, the Plaintiffs Motion is denied upon this ground.
G Service upon the Personal Representative
Plaintiff next argues that the Suggestion of Death was invalid under Rule 25 because it
was not served upon the personal representative of the deceased party's estate. In Fehrenbacher,
supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519, the Federal court found that the defendant's "own estate ha[d] not
been given proper notice of th[e] pending action, and in th[e] court's opinion the ninety day
limitation ha[d] not yet started to run." This reasoning was echoed by the Federal 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals In Grandbouche v. LovelL 913 F,2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990), which found that
"because the personal representative of [the deceased plaintiff's estate did not receive service of
any purported suggestion of death [from the defendant], the ninety-day limitations period did not
begin to run." Id. at 837. Similar reasoning has also been espoused by the Federal 9th Circuit
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Court of Appeals in Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233-234 (9th Cir. 1994 (requiring personal
service upon the decedent's estate, rather than service by mail).
This Court understands and appreciates the requirements imposed by Federal courts
regarding service of the Suggestion of Death upon the personal representative of the Estate. This
Court is also aware that there is no Utah case law specifically addressing the issue. It does not
appear that the Utah courts have adopted any analogous requirement of service. Likewise, the
language of Utah R. Civ. P. 25 does not contain any such requirement. Rather, the Rule provides
that the death is to be suggested on the record and thereafter the surviving party is to file a
Motion to Substitute and notice of hearing which "shall be served on the parties as provided in
rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of
summons". See Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a). The purpose of such a requirement is quite clear: a
personal representative ought to receive notice of a potential claim against the decedent's estate,
or of a potential cause of action which she might be able to pursue on the decedent's behalf.
Without such notice, a personal representative would be unable to effectively perform her
responsibilities. However, under Utah's Rule, that notice comes to the personal representative
in the form of a Motion to Substitute and not a copy of the Suggestion of Death served under
Rule 4.
In addition, in the case before the court, the fact is that counsel for Defendant, Mr.
Morgan, himself obtained notice of his client's death from Phyllis Myers, Defendant's daughter
and personal representative of Defendant's estate. The fact is also that when Mr. Morgan filed
the Suggestion of Death, he was acting both as the lawyer for the deceased party and the lawyer
for the estate of that party. See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, pp. 1-2. The personal representative
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of the estate, Ms. Myers, and her brothers "understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan would
continue to represent the interest of [Defendant]'s estate and [Ms. Myers] as Personal
Representative

" Id. Under these circumstances, where the personal representative already

had notice of Defendants death as well as the cause of action against him, imposing a
requirement that the personal representative be served with the Suggestion of Death when that
Suggestion came from her, would seem nonsensical. To comply with the Federal Courts'
interpretation of Rule 25 in these unique circumstances would effectively have led to the service
of notice upon the person who herself gave council for Defendant original notice. It also would
have meant providing personal service by an attorney upon his own client. Absent any
controlling Utah case authority, this Court is unwilling to impose such unreasonable constraints
upon what ought to be a simplefilingof a Suggestion of Death upon the record..
Consequently, the court finds that because the personal representative of Defendant's
estate had already received real notice of Defendant's death, and had also hired counsel for
Defendant as the attorney for the Estate, the failure of that Counsel to serve the personal
representative with the Suggestion of Death did not here render the ^Suggestion of Death invalid.
There is another concern with the position taken by counsel for the plaintiff in this case.
Again there is no Utah authority on the point but the issue should be addressed in this decision.
This court does not find any language in Rule 25, nor has any case authority been cited, which
would give the Plaintiff any standing to complain about the lack of service of the Suggestion of
Death upon the personal representative. Plaintiff received appropriate service of that Suggestion.
The estate and the personal representative have not complained about the lack of service of that
Suggestion upon them. The court can find no basis for conferring standing on the Plaintiff to
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argue that the Suggestion of Death is invalid as to Plaintiff because it was not served upon the
personal representative. For that reason alone, the Plaintiffs Motion is denied as to this point.
D. Dismissal for "failure to join a necessary party"
Plaintiff next argues that the dismissal of this case under Rule 25 should have been
without prejudice, rather that with prejudice. At the oral argument in this matter, plaintiffs
counsel seemed to argue this issue by analogy to Rule 41, Utah Rules Civil Procedure. Though
the issue of whether Plaintiff ought to have been dismissed without prejudice under the
indispensable party prong of Rule 41(b) was not raised by the Plaintiff Stoddard in this case, the
Court will nonetheless address the issue because of the relationship between this case and the
corresponding case of Donahue v. Smith, 980500102 [heard in conjunction with the present
action for the limited purpose of addressing dismissal of both cases under Rule 25(a)].
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) directs that a dismissal should act as an "adjudication upon the
merits" unless it is for one of three reasons stated in the Rule, including "for lack of an
indispensable party". Dismissals for one of the three named exceptions are to be without
prejudice.
Relying on Black's Law Dictionary, Plaintiff Donahue contends that "the very reason that
this litigation cannot continue renders the personal representative 'indispensable.' . . . In this
matter the personal representative is such a[n indispensable] party [because t]he action cannot
proceed without him or her. Therefore, the failure to substitute (and that is simply another word
for join) the personal representative for the decedent amounts to a failure to join an indispensable
party." See Donahue v. Smith. Case No. 980500102, Memorandum Supporting Plaintiff
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Donahue's Rule 59(e) Motion, p. 2 [hereinafter Donahue Joinder Memo]. Plaintiff argues that
this dismissal should be treated like a dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party under
Rule 41(b), which would result in a dismissal without prejudice.
Responding to this argument, Defendant contends that Plaintiff confuses Utah R. Civ. P.
19 with Utah R. Civ. P. 25. "Had the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure considered
the substitution of a representative the same as the joining of an indispensable party," Defendant
declares, "they would not have created two separate rules. Furthermore, the personal
representative was not an indispensable party at the beginning of the lawsuit...." .See Donahue
v. Smith. Case No. 980500102, Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion, pp. 13-14
[hereinafter Defendant's Objection to Joinder].
In analysis of the parties arguments, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to cite any
authority to support the assertion that a personal representative substituted as a party under Rule
25(a) should be considered the same as an indispensable party to be joined under Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 19(a). Moreover, the Court finds no authority to support this assertion. The reason for this
lack of authority may lie in Plaintiff Donahue's erroneous assumption that the terms substitution
and joinder are synonymous in both meaning and effect, under the Rules of Civil Procedure. On
the contrary, this Courtfindsthat the term "joinder," as outlined in Rule 19, refers to the process
of "uniting" two or more persons in a legal proceeding. See Black's Law Dictionary 581 (abr. 6th
ed. 199a). By contrast, the term "substitution" refers instead to "the replacement of one party to
an action by another party because of death

" Id. at 998. There are two different Rules to

treat two different procedures.
In the present case, Ms. Myers, the personal representative, would not be "united" or
"joined" with the decedent as a second defendant. Instead, if she were to be made a party, she
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would "replace"or "substitute" for the decedent as the defendant in this action. The drafters of
the Rules of Civil Procedure obviously appreciated the difference between joinder and
substitution. The presence of the word "join" in Rule 41(b) rather that "substitute" supports this
conclusion. It would have been an easy matter for the drafters to include "substitution of a
party" in Rule 41(b) as one of the dismissals which would be without prejudice, if that had been
their intent. Instead, a different Rule was created to treat the matter of substitution in the case of
the death of one or more part*' J.
Moreover, under ordinary rules of statutory construction, a statute or rule must be read
according to its plain meaning. An involuntary dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) acts as
an adjudication upon the merits (dismissal with prejudice) unless it is a dismissal for one of three
specific reasons which are listed as exceptions to the general rule. Rule 41(b) does not list
"substitution of parties" as one of the three exceptions. The exceptions listed in the Rule are
"lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue," or "lack of an indispensable party." Consequently,
even if Rule 41 has application to this case, which this court does not find to be the case, this
dismissal would be with prejudice under the clear provisions of that Rule, as the dismissal was
for failure to substitute a party for a deceased defendant under Rule 25, rather than for failure to
join an indispensable party under Rule 19.
As a final note, both Federal case law and case law from sister states contain example? of
Rule 25(a) claims which have been dismissed "with prejudice." See, e.g., Frances v. Frances,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4257: See also, e.g., Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Price, 539
So.2d 202 (Ala. 1989)[hereinafter Price]. In explanation, such cases have reasoned that "[a]
dismissal for failure to substitute should do more than merely require a plaintiff to seek a new
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place on the trial calendar; it should put an end to the litigation for all time." £ee Price, supra.
539 So.2d at 204. Likewise, as reflected in its prior Opinion, this Court continues to hold that if
Rule 25(a) is to have any meaningful effect, dismissal under its terms must be with prejudice.

2. Motion to Substitute
Because the Court canfindno basis upon which to alter or amend its previous decision
dismissing this action, it does not reach Plaintiffs "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant." That Motion is
mooted by the dismissal of the case for failure to comply with Rule 25.

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court orders that Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to
Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions be, and hereby is, denied. Likewise, plaintiffs
Motion to Substitute is denied.
Since Plaintiff has already filed an appeal in this case, and since the parties entered into a
stipulation at the oral argument that the court should enter the following order, the clerk of this
court is hereby instructed to accept thefilingfee already paid as the fee for an appeal from this
decision, which will be the final decision of the court. Counsel for Defendant is ordered to
prepare and submit an Order incorporating this Ruling and the court's previous Memorandum
Decision and again ordering this case dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 12th day of October 1999.

J/PHILIFEVES, District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM "C

S. BARD MORGAN (A2314)
S. BROOK MILLARD (A7415)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,

SUGGESTION OF DEATH

Plaintiff,

vs.
SETH ALBERT SMITH,

Civil No. 98CV102

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and as otherwise may be
required by law, the above-named parties are hereby notified of the death of Defendant Seth A.
Smith which occurred December 23, 1998.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.

DATED this 2f *day of December, 1998.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSOI

S. BAIRD MORGAN,
S. BROOK MEUU
Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and^ correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this />'H- day of December, 1998 to the following:
Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North St.
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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